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Abstract
We consider a dynamic model in which shareholders delegate a manager, who observes
private information about running and liquidation costs of the rm, to operate the rm.
We analytically derive the shareholders' optimal contract contingent on the cost struc-
ture of the rm. The information asymmetries change the high-cost rm's default and
liquidation timing. Even if the liquidation value is higher than the face value of debt, the
shareholders of the high-cost rm, unlike in the symmetric information case, can choose
default rather than liquidation in order to reduce the information rent to the manager.
The information asymmetries accelerate negative liquidation and delay positive liquida-
tion, while they accelerate default. Although the information asymmetries decrease the
equity and rm values, they may increase the debt value. The optimal leverage ratio of
the asymmetric information case becomes higher than that of the symmetric information
case because more debt mitigates the loss due to the information asymmetries. Our re-
sults can potentially account for many empirical ndings.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal works by Leland (1994), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), and Fan
and Sundaresan (2000) many papers have investigated the dynamic models of default,
liquidation, and debt renegotiation. Combining this literature with the real options lit-
erature (e.g., McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), many papers,
including Mauer and Sarkar (2005), Sundaresan and Wang (2007), Shibata and Nishihara
(2012), and Sundaresan, Wang, and Yang (2015), have developed the dynamic theory of
investment and nancing. Most of the previous research, however, has focused mainly on
the conicts between the equity holders and debt holders.
On the other hand, in recent years, several papers also have investigated the manager-
shareholders conicts in the dynamic investment models. For instance, Grenadier and
Wang (2005) showed how the investment timing is distorted when the shareholders dele-
gate the investment decision to the manager who has private information. In their frame-
work, Shibata and Nishihara (2010) also derived the investment timing of the levered rm
with the optimal capital structure.1
In this paper, we investigate how the information asymmetries between the manager
and shareholders aect the rm's default and liquidation. In other words, we examine the
conicts among the manager, shareholders, and debt holders on default and liquidation.
Our model builds largely on Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(2001), and Grenadier and Wang (2005). Following Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997),
we consider the shareholders who choose between default (stopping the coupon payments)
and liquidation (scrapping and/or selling the assets along with retiring the face value of
debt).2 Following Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), we also assume the trade-o between
the tax shield and default costs of debt. Last and most importantly, as in Grenadier
and Wang (2005), we consider the information asymmetries between the manager and
shareholders. The shareholders delegate the manager, who observes private information
about running and liquidation costs of the rm (high-cost or low-cost rm), to operate the
rm. The shareholders oer a contract, which consists of the default or liquidation timing
and compensation contingent on the rm's cost structure, to the manager so that they
can maximize the ex-ante equity value. The asymmetric information model approximates
rms that have diuse ownership as well as a lower level of transparency and disclosure.
In the model, we analytically derive the shareholders' optimal contract. As in the
previous papers, including Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010),
we show that only the high-cost rm's behavior changes from that of the symmetric
1In other perspectives, Sannikov (2008), Grenadier and Malenko (2011), and Morellec and Sch'urho (2011),
among others, examined the dynamic models involving asymmetric information.
2Although Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) also examined the possibility of debt renegotiation, we do
not consider debt renegotiation but focus on the eects of the information asymmetries on the default and
liquidation timing.
1
information case. Although, as in the symmetric information case, the rm with more
existing debt (scrap value) tends to proceed to default (liquidation), the shareholders'
choice of default in the high-cost rm is encouraged by the information asymmetries.
This is because the choice of default in the high-cost rm reduces the information rent
to the manager of the low-cost rm. If this eect is stronger, the shareholders causes the
high-cost rm to default even when the liquidation value is higher than the face value.
In another perspective, we argue that more existing debt, which tends to cause de-
fault rather than liquidation, can play a positive role in reducing the information rent to
the manager and alleviating the loss due to the information asymmetries. This result is
similar to that of Lambrecht and Myers (2008). They showed that risky debt can miti-
gate manager-shareholder conicts, although their model does not include the manager's
private information but considers the shareholders' possibility of ring the manager and
closing or managing the rm by themselves.
The default timing of the high-cost rm is accelerated due to the information asym-
metries because the shareholders can decrease the information rent to the manager by ac-
celerating default. This is contrary to the result in the previous papers, such as Grenadier
and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010), showing that the high-cost rm's
investment timing is delayed. However, the opposite result is straightforward because our
model is not an investment timing model but a default timing model. Our result is also
in line with the empirical evidence by Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003). Actually, they
found that family rms are more likely than rms with diversied ownership to value rm
survival and hence better protect the debt holders' interests.
More notably, the eects of the information asymmetries on liquidation are equivocal.
The liquidation timing is accelerated (delayed) when the information asymmetries in the
running costs are larger (smaller) than those of the liquidation costs. Our results are
contrasted with the monotonic results in the previous literature, such as Grenadier and
Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010). When the eect of the running costs is
larger, the high-cost rm liquidates earlier than the low-cost rm to save the high running
cost. We hereafter call this case negative liquidation, which can be related to a case of
scrapping the rm. When the eect of the liquidation costs is larger, the low-cost rm
liquidates earlier to gain the high liquidation value. We hereafter call this case positive
liquidation, which can be related to a case of selling the rm. Our result suggests that the
information asymmetries accelerate negative liquidation and delay positive liquidation.
The information asymmetries reduce the equity and rm values and increase the man-
ager's value. The debt and social values may increase due to the information asymmetries.
Below, we explain how the debt holders can potentially take advantage of the manager-
shareholder conicts under asymmetric information. Due to the default timing accelerated
by the contract, the debt holders take over the rm earlier than in the symmetric infor-
mation case. The early-defaulted rm may have a higher value than the debt value in
the symmetric information case. For example, the shareholders can choose default of the
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high-cost rm to save the information rent even when the liquidation value is higher than
the face value of debt. In this case, the debt holders can take over the rm which has a
higher value than the face value. This also means that the debt value of the high-cost rm
can be higher than that of the low-cost rm. The results also suggest the possibility of
counter-intuitive market reactions as follows: The debt value rises as the rm approaches
default, and it jumps downward (upward) when the rm's type appears to be low-cost
(high-cost). Our results can potentially account for excess returns of the vulture investors'
strategy that they buy a large block of debt of a distressed rm and thereafter control
the rm (e.g., Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997)).
Furthermore, we show several results in the comparative statics. Higher costs of the
low-cost rm can increase the equity value. In the asymmetric information case, higher
costs of the low-cost rm play a positive role in decreasing the manager's private informa-
tion. When this positive eect dominates the direct and negative eect of the higher costs,
the higher costs increase the equity value. A higher volatility tends to cause the wealth
transfer from the debt holders and manager to the equity holders. The asset substitution
between the equity holders and debt holders is consistent with the standard results (e.g.,
Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The asset substitution between the manager and equity
holders is also found in Shibata (2009) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010).
In the optimal capital structure, we nd that the initial coupon of debt, leverage, and
credit spread in the asymmetric information case are higher than those of the symmetric
information case. This is because issuing more risky debt reduces the information rent
to the manager. This result is consistent with Lambrecht and Myers (2008), who argued
that risky debt can mitigate manager-shareholder conicts. Several empirical studies,
including Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) and McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001),
showed the positive relation between the ownership dispersion and leverage. Our result
is also related to the empirical evidence by John and Litov (2010) that rms with weaker
governance tend to use more debt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. As a benchmark, Section 2
presents the results in the symmetric information case. Section 3 shows the key results in
the asymmetric information case. In Section 4, we discuss several implications regarding
market reactions and the optimal capital structure as well as the comparative statics.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Symmetric information
2.1 Setup
The symmetric information model builds on the seminal works of Mella-Barral and Per-
raudin (1997) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). We consider a rm that is receiving
EBIT (earnings before interests and taxes) X(t)   (w + wi) at time t, where X(t) is a
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stochastic component and w + wi stands for the rm's running costs. We also suppose
that the rm issued console debt with coupon C( 0) and is paying the coupon C con-
tinuously. Following the standard real options literature, we assume that X(t) follows a
geometric Brownian motion:
dX(t) = X(t)dt+ X(t)dB(t) (t > 0); X(0) = x;
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion dened in a probability space (
;F ;P)
and ; (> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. We assume that the initial value, X(0) = x, is
suciently large to exclude the rm's default or liquidation at time 0. A positive constant
r denotes the interest rate, and for convergence we assume that r > .
The running costs consist of two components: a public component w( 0) and a private
component wi( 0). The private component potentially takes on two types: wL (i = L:
Low-cost rm) and wH (i = H: High-cost rm), which satises w = wH   wL > 0. In
liquidation (scrapping and/or selling the assets), the rm receives the value    i( 0)
depending on the type.3 The component ( 0) is publicly observed, while the cost i( 0)
is privately observed. Assume that  = H   L  0.4 We assume that the shareholders
delegate a manager to run the rm until the default or liquidation time.5 When default
takes place, the former debt holders take over, own, operate, and liquidate the rm.6
For simplicity, we consider neither delegation nor debt nancing after the changes in the
ownership. After default, the rm has no debt and receives EBIT (1 )(X(t) w wi)
until liquidation, where  2 (0; 1) denotes the contraction parameter introduced in Mella-
Barral and Perraudin (1997) and also corresponds to the default costs in Leland (1994) and
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). For the details of the default costs, see also Hotchkiss,
John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008). Following Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), we
assume that the liquidation value   i is not changed by the transfers in the ownership.
Throughout the paper, we assume the manager, shareholders, and debt holders are all
risk-neutral and observe all information except for the rm's type i, wi, and i. Before
contracting, all agents know that the probability of drawing a low-cost type i = L equals
P 2 (0; 1). In this section, we consider a symmetric information case in which the manager
and shareholders observe the realized type i, private costs wi, and i immediately after
3For simplicity, this paper does not consider the possibility of partial liquidation, which is typically accom-
panied by debt renegotiation. For instance, Nishihara and Shibata (2016) examined the rm's optimal choice
between full liquidation and partial liquidation with debt restructuring.
4Following Shibata and Nishihara (2010) and Grenadier and Malenko (2011), we assume the manager's
private information on the rm's cost structure. The results are unchanged if we assume the manager's private
information on the rm's prot structure.
5In the real world, a manager who was chosen by the former shareholders, is usually replaced by the new
owners.
6To focus on the information asymmetries between the manager and shareholders, this paper does not
consider debt renegotiation, which has been studied in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan
(2000), and Shibata and Nishihara (2015), among others.
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contracting, while in Section 3 we consider an asymmetric information case in which only
the manager observes the realized type i as well as private costs wi and i immediately
after contracting.
The symmetric (asymmetric) information case corresponds to a case without (with)
separation of ownership and management (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)). For in-
stance, the symmetric information case can capture the behavior of family-owned-and-
managed rms and rms with concentrated equity holdings, while the asymmetric infor-
mation case can capture the behavior of rms with diuse equity holdings. In another
perspective, the symmetric (asymmetric) information case can approximate rms that
have a higher (lower) level of transparency and disclosure. Although Anderson, Duru,
and Reeb (2009) showed the positive relation between ownership concentration and cor-
porate opacity, they focused mainly on the information asymmetries between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders rather than the information asymmetries between
managers and shareholders. Thus, throughout this paper, we relate the asymmetric in-
formation case to rms with more diversied ownership.
Following the standard literature (e.g., Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(2001)), we assume a positive corporate tax rate  and no taxation to the debt holders
to highlight the tax benets of debt. Following Shibata and Nishihara (2010), we also
assume no taxation to the manger, but the results can be easily extended into the case
with a positive tax rate to the manager.
2.2 Solutions
Because all agents observe the realized type i as well as private costs wi and i, our
problem is essentially the same as that of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). In the
rst place, we solve the problem after the shareholders' default. At the default time, the
former debt holders take over and run the rm. They can optimize the liquidation time
of the rm. The rm value right after default becomes
Ai(X(t))
=(1  )

(1  )X(t)
r     
(1  )(w + wi)
r
+max
xi

X(t)
xi
 
 (1  )xi
r    +
(1  )(w + wi)
r
+    i

=(1  )

(1  )X(t)
r     
(1  )(w + wi)
r
+

X(t)
x^i
 
 (1  )x^i
r    +
(1  )(w + wi)
r
+    i

for X(t) > x^i, which is dened by
x^i =
(r   )
   1

w + wi
r
+
   i
1  

; (1)
where  = 1=2   =2   p(=2   1=2)2 + 2r=2(< 0). Note that x^i stands for the
liquidation trigger which is determined by the former debt holders. The former debt
holders run the rm until X(t) hits the liquidation trigger x^i. On the other hand, for
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X(t)  x^i, we have Ai(X(t)) = (1  )(  i), which means that the former debt holders
liquidate immediately after they take over the rm.
At time 0, the shareholders oer the menu (xL; xH ; lL; lH) to the manager, where for
the rm's type i, xi( 0) is the liquidation or default threshold and li is an indicator
function of liquidation (li = 1 for liquidation and li = 0 for default). For simplicity, we
assume that the reservation value for the manager equals 0. Then, the shareholders do not
need to oer any payment to the manager when they observe all information. Following
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), among others, we assume the absolutely priority rule
that the shareholders repay the face value C=r to the debt holders on liquidation. The
shareholders receive    i   C=r on liquidation and receive 0 on default.
At time 0, the shareholders' problem of optimizing the contract is expressed as follows:7
E(x) = max
xL;xH ;lL;lH
(1  )

x
r    + P

 w + wL + C
r
+

x
xL
 
  xL
r    +
w + wL + C
r
+lL

 C
r
+    L

+ (1  P )

 w + wH + C
r
+

x
xH
 
  xH
r    +
w + wH + C
r
+lH

 C
r
+    H

: (2)
Throughout the paper, we use the superscript  for the optimum in the symmetric infor-
mation case. Equation (2) is equal to (1  )
x
r     
w + PwL + (1  P )wH + C
r
+ max
xL;lL

x
xL
 
  xL
r    +
w + wL + C
r
+ lL

 C
r
+    L

+ max
xH ;lH

x
xH
 
  xH
r    +
w + wH + C
r
+ lH

 C
r
+    H

: (3)
The maximization problems in (3) are that of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). When
we x at li = 0, our problems also correspond to that of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001).
Clearly, the optimal solution li is 1 if and only if C=r     i. As in Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), we have the following solutions
to problem (3) by the rst order condition.
Proposition 1
Case (I-S): C=r <    H (Both types liquidate.)
xL =
(r   )
   1

w + wL
r
+    L

(4)
xH =
(r   )
   1

w + wH
r
+    H

(5)
lL = l

H = 1
7It is not meaningful to consider a contract that includes C because C = 0 maximizes the equity value. It
is not meaningful even if we consider a contract that includes C and maximizes the rm value. In this case,
the rm can receive tax advantages without default costs and the rm value becomes innity when we choose
C = 1 and xi = 0. In other words, our model, like in the standard literature such as Leland (1994) and
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), presumes the ex-post conicts between the equity holders and debt holders.
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The ex-post equity values are
EL(x) = (1  )

x
r     
w + wL + C
r
+

x
xL
 
  x

L
r    +
w + wL
r
+    L

(6)
EH(x) = (1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH
r
+    H

(7)
The ex-post debt values are
DL(x) = D

H(x) = C=r:
Case (II-S):    H  C=r <    L (Only the low-cost type liquidates.)
xL = (4)
xH =
(r   )
   1
w + wH + C
r
(8)
lL = 1; l

H = 0
The ex-post equity values are
EL(x) = (6)
EH(x) = (1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH + C
r

: (9)
The ex-post debt values are
DL(x) = C=r
DH(x) (< C=r)
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
C
r
+

x
xH
 
 C
r
+ (1  )(   H)

(C=r  (   H)=(1  ))
C
r
+

x
xH
 
 C
r
+ (1  )

(1  )xH
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r

+(1  )

x
x^H
 
 (1  )x^H
r    +
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+    H

((   H)=(1  ) < C=r)
(10)
Case (III):    L  C=r (Both types default.)
xL =
(r   )
   1
w + wL + C
r
(11)
xH = (8)
lL = 0; l

H = 0
The ex-post equity values are
EL(x) = (1  )

x
r     
w + wL + C
r
+

x
xL
 
  x

L
r    +
w + wL + C
r

(12)
EH(x) = (9):
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The ex-post debt values are
DL(x)
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
C
r
+

x
xL
 
 C
r
+ (1  )(   L)

(   L < C=r  (   L)=(1  ))
C
r
+

x
xL
 
 C
r
+ (1  )

(1  )xL
r     
(1  )(w + wL)
r

+(1  )

x
x^L
 
 (1  )x^L
r    +
(1  )(w + wL)
r
+    L

((   L)=(1  ) < C=r)
(13)
DH(x) = (10)
Note that ex-ante equity and debt values are E(x) = PEL(x) + (1   P )EH(x) and
D(x) = PDL(x) + (1  P )DH(x), respectively. Also, note that the ex-post and ex-ante
manager's values, denoted by Mi (x) (i = L;H) and M
(x), respectively, are equal to 0.
As in the standard literature (e.g., Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001)),
Proposition 1 entails the conicts between the equity holders and debt holders, while
it does not entail the conicts between the manager and equity holders. Depending on
whether the face value of debt, C=r, is higher than the liquidation value    i, we can
classify the results into Cases (I-S), (II-S), and (III). These results are essentially the same
as those of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). Proposition 1 leads to the straightforward
result that the rm with more existing debt (liquidation value) tends to proceed to default
(liquidation). In the liquidation case, i.e., C=r <    i, the debt value Di (x) is equal
to the face value C=r because the debt holders receive C=r at the liquidation time. In
the default case, i.e.,    i  C=r, the ownership of the rm is transferred to the former
debt holders at the default time, and they decide whether they continue to operate or
immediately liquidate the rm. In this case, the debt value is less than C=r (see Mella-
Barral and Perraudin (1997)). As will be shown by Proposition 4 in Section 3.2, in the
asymmetric information case, the debt values can be higher than the face value C=r.
3 Asymmetric information
3.1 Setup
In this section, we consider the asymmetric information case in which only the manager
observes the realized type i as well as private costs wi and i. The model adds the asym-
metric information model by Grenadier and Wang (2005) to the symmetric information
model in Section 2. The asymmetric information case is more likely to apply to rms that
have more diversied ownership and/or a lower level of transparency and disclosure.
At time 0, the equity holders oer the menu (xL; xH ; lL; lH ; sL; sH) to the manager,
where for the manager's report j, xj is the liquidation or default threshold, lj is the
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indicator function of liquidation, and sj is the severance pay on the liquidation or default
timing.8 The manager accepts the oer and starts running the rm if it satises the
participation condition, which will be explained later. Immediately after taking over the
rm, the manager observes the rm's type i and cost wi and reports the rm's type j and
cost wj to the equity and debt holders. If lj = 1, the manager liquidates at the threshold
xj . Only the manager observes the true liquidation cost i. If lj = 0, the manager stops
paying the coupon C at the threshold xj . On the default timing, the manager is red and
the rm is taken over by the former debt holders.
The equity and debt holders cannot verify whether the manager's report j is equal to
the real type i. Thus, the manager may have incentive to falsely report j 6= i, receive
wj  wi until the default or liquidation time, and receive lj(j   i) and sj at the default
or liquidation time.9 However, we can easily check that the revelation principle holds.
Therefore, the shareholders can nd the optimal menu (xL ; x

H ; l

L ; l

H ; s

L ; s

H ) within
the menus that lead the manager to truthfully report j = i. Throughout the paper, we
use the superscript  for the optimum in the asymmetric information case. We assume
that no opportunity for renegotiation exists. Although the ex-ante commitment may lead
to ex-post ineciency in default and liquidation decisions, it increases the ex-ante equity
value. It should also be noted that management compensation tends to depend more on
the rm's performance in a distressed rm than in an ordinary rm (e.g., Hotchkiss, John,
Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008)).
3.2 Solutions
At time 0, the shareholders' problem is expressed as
E(x) = max
xL;xH ;lL;lH
sL;sH
(1  )

x
r    + P

 w + wL + C
r
+

x
xL
 
  xL
r    +
w + wL + C
r
+lL

 C
r
+    L

  sL

+ (1  P )

 w + wH + C
r
+

x
xH
 
  xH
r    +
w + wH + C
r
+lH

 C
r
+    H

  sH

(14)
subject to the incentive compatibility conditions
x
xL

sL  w
r
+

x
xH
 
 w
r
+ lH + sH

; (15)
x
xH

sH   w
r
+

x
xL
 w
r
  lL + sL

(16)
8The assumption of the severance pay is not essential. Actually, the results are unchanged when we assume
the payments to the manager at time 0 instead of the severance pay.
9As in the standard contract theory, the terms w and  can be interpreted not only as the manager's
prots by outright frauds such as embezzlement and hiding property and assets on liquidation but also as some
increases in the manager's utility. For instance, the manager may run and liquidate the rm with costs wH and
H by putting less eorts into the low-cost rm than into the high-cost rm.
9
and the ex-post participation conditions
sL  0 (17)
sH  0: (18)
Under condition (15), the manager who observes the low cost reports truthfully because
the expected payo with the truthful report, i.e., the left-hand side value of (15), is larger
than the expected payo with the false report, i.e., the right-hand side value of (15).
Note that the manager who falsely reports the high-cost type gains  if and only if the
shareholder chooses default of the high-cost rm, i.e., lH = 1. Similarly, condition (16)
ensures that the manager who observes the high-cost reports truthfully. Note that the
objective function (14) is equal to (2) minus the severance pay. The ex-ante participation
condition follows from (17) and (18).
We can remove (17) because it is always satised under (15) and (18). We can readily
show that in optimum, sH = 0, which means the manager's value M

H (x) is equal to 0 in
the high-cost rm. In addition, we can easily see that the problem with (lL; lH) = (0; 1)
is dominated by the problem with (lL; lH) = (1; 1) for C=r  H and dominated by the
problem with (lL; lH) = (0; 0) for C=r > H . Thus, we need to solve the three remaining
cases and compare the maximal values. In the following proposition, Cases (I), (II), and
(III) correspond to (lL ; l

H ) = (1; 1); (1; 0), and (0; 0), respectively. Note that in optimum,
the equality holds in (15). For the proof, refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 2 The optimal contract (xL ; x

H ; l

L ; l

H ; s

L ; s

H ) is as follows. In all cases,
xL = x

L and s

H = 0.
Case (I): C=r <    H  P=(1  P ) (Both types liquidate.)
xH =
(r   )
(   1)

w + wH
r
+    H + P
1  P

w
r
 

(19)
lL = l

H = 1
sL =

xL
x
 w
r
+

xL
xH
 
 w
r
+

(> 0) (20)
The ex-post equity values are
EL (x) = E

L(x)  (1  )

w
r
+

x
xH
 
 w
r
+

(21)
EH (x) = (1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH
r
+    H

(22)
The ex-post debt values are
DL (x) = D

H (x) = C=r:
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The ex-post manager's value is
ML (x) =
w
r
+

x
xH
 
 w
r
+

(23)
Case (II):    H  P=(1  P )  C=r <    L (Only the low-cost type liquidates.)
xH =
(r   )
(   1)

w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P
w
r

(24)
lL = 1; l

H = 0
sL =

xL
x
 w
r
 

xL
xH
 w
r
(> 0) (25)
The ex-post equity values are
EL (x) = E

L(x)  (1  )

w
r
 

x
xH
 w
r

(26)
EH (x) = (1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH + C
r

: (27)
The ex-post debt values are
DL (x) = D

L(x) = C=r
DH (x)
=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
C
r
+

x
xH
 
 C
r
+ (1  )(   H)

(C=r  (   H)=(1  ) wP=r(1  P ))
C
r
+

x
xH
 
 C
r
+ (1  )

(1  )xH
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r

+(1  )

x
x^H
 
 (1  )x^H
r    +
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+    H

((   H)=(1  ) wP=r(1  P ) < C=r):
(28)
The ex-post manager's value is
ML (x) =
w
r
 

x
xH
 w
r
(29)
Case (III):    L  C=r (Both types default.)
xH = (24); l

L = l

H = 0; s

L = (25):
The ex-post equity values are
EL (x) = (26); E

H (x) = (27):
The ex-post debt values are
DL (x) = D

L(x); D

H (x) = (28):
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The ex-post manager's value is
ML (x) = (29)
Note that ex-ante equity, debt, and manager's values are E(x) = PEL (x) + (1  
P )EH (x), D
(x) = PDL (x)+ (1 P )DH (x), and M(x) = PML (x), respectively. As
in Proposition 1, we classied the results into three cases, and we have the straightforward
result that the rm with more existing debt (liquidation value) tends to proceed to default
(liquidation).
A most notable result is that the threshold between Cases (I) and (II) is lower than the
threshold between Cases (I-S) and (II-S) in Proposition 1 by P=(1   P ). To be more
precise, for   H  P=(1 P )  C=r <   H , the high-cost rm's strategy is default
under asymmetric information, while it is liquidation under symmetric information (see
Table 1). This means that in the asymmetric information case, the high-cost rm can
default even if the liquidation value  H is higher than the face value of debt, C=r. The
intuition is as follows. The manager's private information consists of two components: w
for the running costs and  for the liquidation costs. In Case (I), the shareholders pay
the information rent for both w and  to the low-cost rm's manager, while in Case (II)
or (III), the shareholders pay the information rent only for w. In Case (II) or (III), the
shareholders can save the information rent for  because the manager of the low-cost rm
cannot gain  by feigning the high-cost type. For  H P=(1 P )  C=r <  H ,
the eect of saving the information rent by choosing default of the high-cost rm dominates
the direct gain    H   C=r by choosing liquidation of the high-cost rm. This is why
under asymmetric information the shareholders can choose default even when    H is
higher than C=r.
Now, we look at Proposition 2 from the viewpoint of existing debt C=r. In Case
(I), the manager's value ML (x) (see (23)) is independent of C=r because x

H (see (19))
is independent of C=r. When C=r increases to    H   P=(1   P ), ML (x) jumps
downward to (29) from (23) because the information rent  disappears at this point.
From this point, ML (x) (see (29)) monotonically decreases with C=r because x

H (see
(24)) monotonically increases with C=r. Thus, we argue that more existing debt can play
a role in alleviating the asymmetric information problem and decreasing the manager's
value. In other words, a debt nancing constraint can worsen the manager-shareholder
conicts. Our result is similar to the nding of Lambrecht and Myers (2008). They showed
that risky debt can mitigate manager-shareholder conicts, although their model does not
include the manager's private information but considers the shareholders' possibility of
ring the manager and closing or managing the rm by themselves. A similar result is
also found in Lambrecht and Myers (2012). We will turn back to this argument in the
analysis of the optimal capital structure in Section 4.3.
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In this paper, we consider the severance pay sj on the liquidation or default timing,
but we have other types of compensation schemes, which achieve the same maximum for
the equity holders.10 In the following corollary, we present the compensation that does
not depend on the initial state variable x.
Corollary 1 The following compensation scheme achieves the same results as in Propo-
sition 2.
Case (I): C=r <    H  P=(1  P )
If xH  xL, the shareholders continuously pay w until X(t)  xH and pay the
severance pay (xL=x

H )
 at xL to the the low-cost rm's manager. Otherwise, the
shareholders continuously pay w until X(t)  xL and pay the severance pay w=r +
(xL=x

H )
( w=r +) at xL to the low-cost rm's manager.
Case (II) or (III):    HP=(1  P )  C=r
If xH  xL, the shareholders continuously pay w until X(t)  xH to the low-cost rm's
manager. Otherwise, the shareholders continuously pay w until X(t)  xL and pay the
severance pay w=r   (xL=xH )w=r at xL to the low-cost rm's manager.
In the compensation scheme of Corollary 1, the equity holders pay w + wL + w,
which is exactly equal to the payment w+wH to the high-cost rm's manager, to the low-
cost rm's manager until X(t) hits max(xL; x

H ). Thus, we can implement this optimal
contract by assuming that the manager reports the rm's type at the default or liquidation
time rather than at the initial time. In this case, until X(t) > max(xL; x

H ), the equity
and debt holders cannot observe the rm's type, and hence the equity and debt values
remain the ex-ante values E(x) and D(x), respectively. In Section 4.1, we will relate
this situation to equity and debt market reactions.
As to the default and liquidation thresholds, we can show the following proposition.
For the proof, see Appendix B.
Proposition 3 The default and liquidation thresholds satisfy the following relation.
Case (I): C=r <    H  P=(1  P )
xH
8>><>>:
> xH > x

L = x

L ( < w=r)
= xH = x

L = x

L ( = w=r)
< xH < x

L = x

L ( > w=r)
Cases (I-S) and (II) :    H  P=(1  P )  C=r <    H
If   w=r,
xH > x

H  xL = xL
10We cannot increase the equity value beyond E(x) of Proposition 2 because there are only two types i = L
and H.
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Otherwise,
xH
8>><>>:
< xH < x

L = x

L (   H  P=(1  P )  C=r <    H  wP=r(1  P ))
= xH < x

L = x

L (C=r =    H  wP=r(1  P ))
> xH < x

L = x

L (   H  wP=r(1  P ) < C=r     H)
Case (II-S):    H  C=r <    L
xH
8>><>>:
> xH < x

L = x

L (   H  C=r <    L  w=r)
> xH = x

L = x

L (C=r =    L  w=r)
> xH > x

L = x

L (   L  w=r < C=r <    L)
Case (III):    L < C=r
xH > x

H > x

L = x

L
The liquidation and default timing of the low-cost rm is not changed by the infor-
mation asymmetries. The default timing of the high-cost rm is always earlier in the
asymmetric information case than in the symmetric information case.11 This is because
the shareholders can decrease the incentive for the low-cost rm's manager to feign the
high cost by increasing the default threshold xH beyond x

H . The logic behind our re-
sult is the same as that of the previous papers, such as Grenadier and Wang (2005) and
Shibata and Nishihara (2010). They showed that the high-cost rm's investment time is
delayed due to the information asymmetries. However, we have the opposite result that
the high-cost rm's default time is accelerated by the information asymmetries because
we consider not investment timing but default timing.
On the other hand, in Case (I), the high-cost rm's liquidation timing can be earlier
or later in the asymmetric information case than in the symmetric information case. The
sensitivity depends on whether the information asymmetries about running costs, w=r,
are larger than those of liquidation costs, . An increase in the liquidation threshold
xH decreases the information rent for w=r but increases the information rent for .
For  < w=r, the shareholders increase xH beyond x

H because the former eect is
stronger than the latter. In this case, the high-cost rm liquidates earlier than the low-
cost rm, and, hence, liquidation is regarded as negative due to the high running cost. For
instance, negative liquidation may occur in the case of scrapping a rm piecemeal. Our
result suggests that the information asymmetries accelerate negative liquidation. On the
other hand, for  > w=r, the shareholders decrease xH below x

H because the latter
eect is stronger than the former. In this case, the low-cost rm liquidates earlier than
the high-cost rm, and, hence, liquidation is regarded as the positive consequence of the
11Proposition 3 shows that xH > x

H in Case (II-S) or (III). On the other hand, the relation between x

H and
xH is ambiguous when both Cases (I-S) and (II) are satised. This is because x

H is the liquidation trigger,
while xH is the default trigger.
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high liquidation value. For instance, positive liquidation may occur in the case of selling
a rm as a going concern. Our result suggests that the information asymmetries delay
positive liquidation.
For  < w=r or  > w=r, the shareholders succeed in reducing the information
rent to the manager by adjusting the liquidation trigger xH . However, for  = w=r, the
shareholders cannot decrease the information rent by adjusting xH . Thus, the liquidation
timing remains unchanged from that of the symmetric information case. Our equivocal
results about the liquidation timing are contrasted with the monotonic results in the
previous literature, including Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara
(2010). The novel result stems from the fact that our model, unlike those in the previous
literature, includes two dierent types of private information, w and .
Except for Case (II), the distance between xH and x

L = x

L is larger than the distance
between xH and x

L. This property is the same as in the existing literature such as
Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010). However, in Case (II),
the distance between xH and x

L = x

L can be smaller than the distance between x

H
and xL. The reason is that in Case (II), x

H is the default threshold in the asymmetric
information case, while xL = x

L is the liquidation threshold.
12 Thus, we have ambiguous
results, which are dierent from the previous ndings.
To summarize, we have the following empirical predictions: Firms with more diversi-
ed ownership and/or a lower level of transparency and disclosure tend to default earlier.
Firms with more diversied ownership and/or a lower level of transparency and disclo-
sure tend to do negative (positive) liquidation earlier (later). Our result regarding the
default timing aligns with the empirical evidence in Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003).
They showed that rms with family ownership are more likely than rms with diversied
ownership to value rm survival and hence better protect the debt holders' interests.
We now turn to the values. We dene the rm value, denoted by F (x), and social value,
denoted by SV (x), as the sum of the equity and debt values and the sum of the equity,
debt, and manager's values, respectively. Clearly, we have F i (x) = SV

i (x) (i = L;H) and
F (x) = SV (x) in the symmetric information case. On the other hand, by Proposition 2
we have F H (x) = SV

H (x) and SV

L (x) = E

L (x)+D

L(x)+M

L (x) = SV

L (x)+M

L (x)
in the asymmetric information case. As to the equity, debt, rm, manager's, and social
values, we have the following proposition. See Appendix C for the proof.
Proposition 4 In all cases, the equity, manager's, and social values satisfy the following
12xH can be either the default or liquidation threshold
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equations:13
EH (x)  EH(x)  EL (x) < EL(x); E(x) < E(x);
MH (x) =M

H(x) =M

L(x) = 0 < M

L (x); M
(x) = 0 < M(x);
F H (x)  F H(x) < F L(x); F L (x) < F L(x); F (x) < F (x);
SV H (x)  SV H(x) < SV L (x) < SV L (x):
Case (I): C=r <    H  P=(1  P )
DH (x) = D

L (x) = D

H(x) = D

L(x) = D
(x) = D(x) = C=r; (30)
F H(x)  F L (x):
Case (II) or (III):    H  P=(1  P )  C=r
DH(x)  DL (x) = DL(x)  C=r: (31)
When AH(x

H ) > C=r, the debt values satisfy
DH(x)  DL (x) = DL(x)  C=r < DH (x); D(x)  C=r < D(x): (32)
The relations of the equity values are straightforward. The equity value in the sym-
metric information case is not lower than that of the asymmetric information case, and
the ex-post equity value in the low-cost rm is not lower than that of the high-cost rm.
In Case (I), the debt and rm values also follow the straightforward relation. As to the
social value, the ex-post social value of the low-cost rm in the asymmetric information
case is higher than that of the symmetric information case because the payment to the
manager, like the coupon payment to the debt holders, generates the tax advantage. Ac-
cordingly, the ex-ante social value in the asymmetric information case can be higher than
that of the symmetric information case.
The results of debt and rm values are ambiguous in Case (II) or (III). For a wide
range of parameter values, we have straightforward relations as follows: The debt and
rm values in the symmetric information case are not lower than those of the asymmetric
information case. The ex-post values of the low-cost rm are not lower than those of
the high-cost rm. The straightforward results are consistent with empirical ndings of
the agency costs of debt in Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003). They found that family
ownership decreases the conicts between the equity holders and debt holders and hence
increases the debt values.
More notably, however, the debt and rm values in Case (II) or (III) may deviate
from the straightforward relations for some parameter values (especially for a high P ).
13The relations (e.g., the relation between SV (x) and SV (x)) other than described in Proposition 4 depend
on the parameter values.
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Especially for AH(x

H ) > C=r, we have (32), which means that the information asymme-
tries increase the ex-post debt value of the high-cost rm beyond the face value of debt,
C=r. Thus, the debt value in the asymmetric information case is higher than that of the
symmetric information case, and the ex-post debt value of the high-cost rm is higher
than that of the low-cost rm.14
This counter-intuitive results can happen in the following two situations. One situation
is where Cases (I-S) and (II) are both satised, i.e.,  H P=(1 P )  C=r <  H .
As explained after Proposition 2, in the high-cost rm the shareholders choose default and
decrease the information rent to the low-cost rm's manager though the liquidation value
 H is higher than C=r. Then, the debt holders take over the rm that has a higher value
than C=r. The counter-intuitive result can happen even if C=r     H . As explained
after Proposition 3, the shareholders increase the default threshold xH of the high-cost
rm to decrease the information rent. When xH is suciently large, the rm which the
debt holders take over can generate a lot of prots until X(t) hits the liquidation trigger
x^H . The relation AH(x

H ) > C=r can be satised in this situation.
Thus, in the high-cost rm, the debt holders can take advantage of the manager-
shareholder conicts under asymmetric information. Our result suggests the possibility
that debt holders can benet from more diversied ownership and a lower level of trans-
parency and disclosure. Relatedly, Shibata and Nishihara (2010) also showed that the
information asymmetries can increase the debt value of the high-cost rm. In their model,
the information asymmetry about the investment costs increases the investment threshold
and then increases the optimal coupon at the investment time. They argue that because
of the increased coupon, the debt value can be higher than that of the symmetric infor-
mation case. However, their model does not lead to a distortion in the default time and
debt value from that of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) because they do not consider
any information asymmetry after investment. Unlike in Shibata and Nishihara (2010), our
model, which focuses on the information asymmetries about running and liquidation costs
of the distressed rm with a xed coupon, can explain how the information asymmetries
distort the default time and debt value.
4 Further analysis
4.1 Jumps in equity and debt values
In this section, we assume that following the contract in Corollary 1 investors do not
observe the rm's type until X(t) hits max(xL; x

H ). Investors evaluate the equity and
debt prices by the ex-ante values E(X(t)) and D(X(t)), respectively, until X(t) >
max(xL; x

H ). At the trigger, they observe the realized type i and change the valuations
14In this case, with respect to the rm values, we may also have F H (x) > F

L (x), but we can show that
F (x) < F (x).
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to the ex-post values Ei (max(x

L; x

H )) and D

i (max(x

L; x

H )). Clearly, the uninformed
equity price E(X(t)) decreases as X(t) decreases to max(xL; x

H ). At that point, as
proved in Proposition 4, the equity value jumps upward to EL (max(x

L; x

H )) (downward
to EH (max(x

L; x

H ))) when the rm type is low-cost (high-cost).
On the other hand, according to Proposition 4, in Case (II) or (III) the debt price can
jump downward (upward) when the rm type is low-cost (high-cost). In addition, the
uninformed debt price D(x) can increase as X(t) decreases to max(xL; x

H ). Figure 1
shows the three types of results about the debt values. The parameter values are set at
Table 215 except for P and C. In the top panel, D(x) increases as X(t) decreases to the
trigger xH , and at the point, the debt value jumps downward (upward) when the rm
type is low-cost (high-cost). According to our computations, this counter-intuitive result
can occur in Case (II) or (III) with a high P and a low C. In the middle panel, D(x)
straightforwardly decreases as X(t) decreases to the trigger xH , and at that point, the
debt value jumps downward (upward) when the rm type is low-cost (high-cost). We also
nd that this result can occur in Case (II) or (III) for a high P and a low or medium C.
The bottom panel shows the straightforward result: D(x) decreases as X(t) decreases
to the trigger xH , and at that point, the debt value jumps upward (downward) when the
rm type is low-cost (high-cost). We tend to have this straightforward result for most of
the parameter values.
Our results can potentially account for a lot of types of excess returns of distressed
rms. In particular, the results are closely associated with the following strategy of vulture
investors. Typically, vulture investors purchase a large block of debt of a distressed rm
and attempt to control the rm as large shareholders after bankruptcy (e.g., Hotchkiss
and Mooradian (1997)). We can explain excess returns of the vulture investors' strategy
not only when the rm type results in low-cost (cf. the bottom panel of Figure 1) but
also when the rm type results in high-cost (cf. the top and middle panels of Figure 1).
4.2 Comparative statics
In this section, we explain several comparative statics results. We focus mainly on counter-
intuitive and non-monotonic results. First, we can analytically show the non-monotonic
impact of the costs of the low-cost rm, wL and L, on the equity and rm values E
(x)
and F (x) in Case (I). For the proof, see Appendix D.
Proposition 5 Case (I) : C=r <    H  P=(1  P )
In the symmetric information case, we have the monotonic relation
@E(x)
@wL
=
@F (x)
@wL
< 0
@E(x)
@L
=
@F (x)
@L
< 0;
15We set the base parameter values following Nishihara and Shibata (2016).
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while in the asymmetric information case, we have the non-monotonic relation
@E(x)
@wL
=
@F (x)
@wL
8>><>>:
< 0 (wL < wH   r)
= 0 (wL = wH   r)
> 0 (wL > wH   r)
@E(x)
@L
=
@F (x)
@L
8>><>>:
< 0 (L < H  w=r)
= 0 (L = H  w=r)
> 0 (L > H  w=r):
In Proposition 5, in the presence of information asymmetries, higher wL and L have
non-monotonic eects on E(x), while in the absence of information asymmetry, higher
wL and L monotonically decrease E
(x). In Case (I), the rm values follow the same
sensitivities as those of the equity values because the rm value is the sum of the equity
value and C=r. In the asymmetric information case, higher wL and L can play a positive
role in decreasing the manager's private information w and , respectively. When
wL > wH   r (L > H  w=r), this indirect and positive eect dominates the direct
and negative eect and improves the equity value. If w = r, the ex-ante equity value
E(x) is exactly equal to the worst-case value EH (x) because of x

L = x

H . This implies
that there is no ecient compensation to resolve the information asymmetries. It is worth
noting that higher wH and H monotonically decrease E
(x) and F (x) because they
increase w and , respectively. We numerically found similar non-monotonic impacts
of wL and L on E
(x); D(x); and F (x) in Case (II) or (III) with a low C, although
we cannot analytically prove the non-monotonic sensitivities. As to the social value, we
also numerically found that SV (x) monotonically decreases with wL and L.
We also examine the comparative statics with respect to  although we cannot ana-
lytically prove the results. Figures 2 and 3 show the comparative statics with respect to
a volatility . We present the results in Case (III). We see from Figure 2 that a higher 
decreases the default triggers (and the manager's values) and increases the equity values
in the symmetric (asymmetric) information cases. The results regarding the default trig-
ger and equity values are straightforward. Because the manager's values stem only from
the private information about the running cost until default, a higher , which shortens
the average default time, reduces the manager's values. We see from Figure 3 that the
debt values decrease with , while the rm and social values are U-shaped with with  in
both symmetric and asymmetric information cases. The result regarding the debt values
is straightforward. The non-monotonic results regarding the rm and social values stem
from the trade-o between increases in the equity values and decreases in the debt and
manager's values. According to our computations, in Case (I) or (II), we found the same
results regarding the default and liquidation triggers as well as the equity and manager's
values. However, the rm and social values tend to monotonically increase with  because
debt can be risk-less and constant in Case (I) or (II).
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In summary, we argue that a higher  causes the wealth transfer from the manager
(and the debt holders) to the equity holders (when debt is risky). The asset substitution
between the shareholders and manager is also consistent with previous ndings in Shibata
(2009) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010). The asset substitution between the equity
holders and debt holders is consistent with the standard results (e.g., Jensen and Meckling
(1976)).
4.3 Optimal capital structure
So far, we have examined the problem with an initial coupon C xed. In this subsection,
we explore the optimal capital structure case, where C is chosen so as to maximize the
ex-ante rm value. Table 3 shows the results, where the parameter values are set at Table
2 except for C. In addition to the symmetric and asymmetric information cases, denoted
by \Sym." and \Asym." in Table 3, respectively, we also present the case \Asym-SV." in
which C is chosen so as to maximize the ex-ante social value. In every case, we obtained
an inverted U -shaped function of C and found that the optimal C is high enough to lead
to Case (III).
In Table 3, the coupon, leverage (denoted by LV ), and credit spread (denoted by CS),
in the asymmetric information case are higher than those of the symmetric information
case. This is because the shareholders decrease the information rent ML (x) to the man-
ager by increasing C and LV . For a high  i, the optimal C can lead to Case (I) or (II).
The results remain unchanged when the optimal C leads to Case (II). As was discussed
after Proposition 2, ML (x) (see (29) and (24)) decreases with C in Case (II) or (III).
Thus, the shareholders can decrease the information rent to the manager by increasing
C and LV . In some cases, in the symmetric information case, the optimal C leads to
Case (I-S), whereas in the asymmetric information case, the optimal C leads to Case (II)
or (III). In these cases, the dierences in C, LV , and CS between the symmetric and
asymmetric cases become larger.
On the other hand, the results regarding C, LV , and CS change from Table 3 when
the optimal C leads to Case (I), i.e., the risk-less debt case. Actually, in this case, the
optimal C agrees with the threshold between Cases (I) and (II) (Cases (I-S) and (II-S))
in the asymmetric (symmetric) information case. The dierence arises mainly because
in Case (I), debt is risk-less and the shareholders cannot decrease ML (x) (see (23) and
(19)) by increasing C and LV .
In summary, we argue that the shareholders can reduce the loss due to the information
asymmetries by increasing risky debt, leverage, and credit spread. This result aligns with
Lambrecht and Myers (2008) and Lambrecht and Myers (2012), who argued that risky
debt can potentially mitigate manager-shareholder conicts, although their model does
not include the information asymmetries. As a testable prediction, our result suggests
that a rm, that has more diuse equity holdings as well as a lower level of transparency
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and disclosure, tends to have a higher leverage ratio. Although there have been ambigu-
ous results about the relation between ownership and leverage (e.g., Anderson and Reeb
(2003), King and Santor (2008)), several papers, such as Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990)
and McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001), empirically support our results. Actu-
ally, they found that ownership dispersion is positively related to leverage. Our result
is also consistent with the empirical evidence by John and Litov (2010) that rms with
weaker governance use more debt.
Lastly, we note that the key results tend to remain unchanged from Propositions 3
and 4 even when we compare the results in the symmetric and asymmetric information
cases for the optimal C instead of a xed C. Indeed, we can see the following results in
Table 3. The information asymmetries accelerate the default timing. The information
asymmetries decrease the equity and rm values, while they can increase the debt value.
We also have an equivocal result in the liquidation timing when the optimal C leads to
Case (I) or (II), although we omit a numerical example.
5 Conclusion
We examined the default and liquidation timing of a rm in which the shareholders
delegate the manager, who observes private information about running and liquidation
costs of the rm, to operate the rm. We analytically derived the shareholders' optimal
contract, which consists of the default or liquidation timing and compensation contingent
on the rm's cost structure. The main results in the asymmetric information case are
summarized as follows.
As in the symmetric information case, the rm with more existing debt (liquidation
value) tends to proceed to default (liquidation). However, unlike in the symmetric in-
formation case, the shareholders can choose default of the high-cost rm and reduce the
compensation to the manager even when the liquidation value is higher than the face value
of debt. More existing debt decreases the compensation to the manager and alleviates the
loss due to the information asymmetries.
Although the information asymmetries do not change the low-cost rm's default and
liquidation timing, they change the high-cost rm's default and liquidation timing. Indeed,
they accelerate (delay) negative (positive) liquidation, while they accelerate default. In
particular, our result regarding the default timing aligns with the empirical evidence
regarding family rms.
While the information asymmetries straightforwardly decrease the equity and rm
values, they may increase the debt value. In other words, the debt holders can take
advantage of the manager-shareholder conicts. In terms of market reactions, our model
can generate a variety of jumps in the equity and debt values. In particular, our results
can potentially explain excess returns of the vulture investors, who target distressed rms.
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We also show several comparative statics results. Higher costs of the low-cost rm can
play a positive role in decreasing the manager's private information. A higher volatility
causes wealth transfer from the debt holders and manager to the equity holders. In
the optimal capital structure, the initial coupon of debt, leverage, and credit spread in
the asymmetric information case are higher than those of the symmetric information
case. This is because an increase in risky debt decreases the loss due to the information
asymmetries. Our results are consistent with empirical ndings of the positive relation
between the ownership dispersion and rm leverage.
A Proof of Proposition 2
We solve the problem (14) subject only to (15) and show that the solution satises (16).
In the optimal solution, we have sH = 0 and (15) is binding because otherwise we can
increase the objective value by decreasing sH and/or sL. Below, we will solve the following
problem:
max
xL;xH ;
lL;lH ;sL
(1  )

x
r    + P

 w + wL + C
r
+

x
xL
 
  xL
r    +
w + wL + C
r
+ lL

 C
r
+    L

 sL)) + (1  P )

 w + wH + C
r
+

x
xH
 
  xH
r    +
w + wH + C
r
+ lH

 C
r
+    H

(33)
subject to

x
xL

sL =
w
r
+

x
xH
 
 w
r
+ lH

; (34)
The problem (33) with (lL; lH) = (0; 1) is dominated by the problem with (lL; lH) = (1; 1)
for C=r  H and dominated by the problem with (lL; lH) = (0; 0) for C=r > H . Then,
we will solve the three remaining cases: (lL; lH) = (1; 1); (1; 0); and (0; 0), and choose the
maximal value.
Solution with (lL; lH) = (1; 1):
By substituting (34) into the objective function (33), the problem (33) can be reduced to
max
xL;xH
(1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+ P

x
xL
 
  xL
r    +
w + wL
r
+    L

+ (1  P )

x
xH
 
  xH
r    +
w + wH
r
+    H   P
1  P

 w
r
+

(35)
=(1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+ P

x
xL
 
  x

L
r    +
w + wL
r
+    L

+ (1  P )

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH
r
+    H   P
1  P

 w
r
+

;
where by the rst order condition xL and x

H are derived as (4) and (19), respectively.
The optimal servant pay sL is derived by (34). Then, we have (x

L; x

H ; s

L ) in Case (I)
of Proposition 2.
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Solution with (lL; lH) = (1; 0):
In the same fashion as above, we have
max
xL;xH
(1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+ P

x
xL
 
  xL
r    +
w + wL
r
+    L

+ (1  P )

x
xH
 
  xH
r    +
w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P
w
r

(36)
=(1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+ P

x
xL
 
  x

L
r    +
wL
r
+    L

+ (1  P )

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P
w
r

;
where by the rst order condition, xL and x

H are derived as (4) and (24), respectively.
The optimal servant pay sL is derived by (34). Therefore, we have (x

L; x

H ; s

L ) in Case
(II) of Proposition 2.
Solution with (lL; lH) = (0; 0):
In the same fashion as above, we can derive xL and x

H as (11) and (24), respectively. We
can derive the optimal servant pay sL by (34). Then, we have (x

L; x

H ; s

L ) in Case (III)
of Proposition 2 and the objective value:
(1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+ P

x
xL
 
  x

L
r    +
w + wL + C
r

+ (1  P )

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P
w
r

;
Next, we compare the objective values in the solutions above. Clearly, the objective
value with (lL; lH) = (0; 0) is larger than that of (lL; lH) = (1; 0) if and only if  L < C=r.
By comparing the objective functions in (35) and (36), we have the objective value with
(lL; lH) = (1; 0) is larger than that of (lL; lH) = (1; 1) if and only if
   H   P
1  P <
C
r
: (37)
Then, we have the optimal solutions (lL ; l

H ) = (1; 1); (1; 0); and (0; 0) in Cases (I), (II),
and (III), respectively.
Finally, we need to check that the solutions satisfy (16). Using (34), we have
(16),  w
r
+

x
xL
 w
r
  lL  + sL

 0
,x L

w
r
  lL 

+ x H

 w
r
+ lH

 0: (38)
Case (I): C=r     H  P=(1  P )
Note that
(38),(x L   x H )

w
r
 

 0:
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We can show this inequality because using (19), we have
xL  xH
,(r   )
(   1)

w + wL
r
+    L

 (r   )
(   1)

w + wH
r
+    H + P
1  P

w
r
 

, (r   )
(   1)(1  P )

 w
r
+

 0
,w
r
   0:
Case (II):    H  P=(1  P ) < C=r     L
Note that
(38),x L

w
r
 

  x
 
H w
r
 0:
If w=r    0, we immediately obtain this inequality. Otherwise, we can show this
inequality because using (24), we have
xH =
(r   )
(   1)

w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P
w
r

>
(r   )
(   1)

w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P

(39)
>
(r   )
(   1)

w + wH
r
+    H

(40)
>
(r   )
(   1)

w + wL
r
+    L

= xL; (41)
where in (39) and (41) we used w=r >  and in (40) we used   H  P=(1 P ) <
C=r.
Case (III):    L < C=r
Note that
(38),x L   x H  0:
By (24) we can show this inequality as follows:
xH =
(r   )
(   1)

w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P
w
r

>
(r   )(w + wH + C)
(   1)r = x

H
>
(r   )(w + wL + C)
(   1)r = x

L:
It is straightforward to obtain the equity, debt, and manager's values in each case.
The proof is completed.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Case (I): C=r     H  P=(1  P )
Note that Case (I) is included in Case (I-S). Then, we can immediately show the relations
by comparing (4), (5), and (19).
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Case (II):    H  P=(1  P ) < C=r     L
We have
xH  xH
,(r   )
(   1)

w + wH + C
r
+
P
1  P
w
r

 (r   )
(   1)

w + wH
r
+max

C
r
;    H

,C
r
    H   P
1  P
w
r
(42)
and
xH  xL
,(r   )
(   1)

w + wH
r
+max

C
r
;    H

 (r   )
(   1)

w + wL
r
+    L

,max

C
r
;    H

    L   w
r
(43)
Using (42) and (43), we can show the relations in Case (II).
Case (III):    L < C=r
We can immediately show the relations by comparing (11), (8), and (24).
C Proof of Proposition 4
Equity values.
By Proposition 2, we can immediately show that EL (x) < E

L(x). By Proposition 2 and
the optimality of xH and l

H , we also have E

H (x)  EH(x). By the revelation principle,
we have E(x)  EH(x). Then, we have
EH(x)  PEL (x) + (1  P )EH (x) = E(x)
 PEL (x) + (1  P )EH(x);
which leads to EH(x)  EL (x).
Manager's values.
The relation immediately follows from Proposition 2.
Debt, rm and social values.
Case (I): C=r     H  P=(1  P )
By Proposition 2, we immediately get (30). Thus, the rm values satisfy the same re-
lations as those of the equity values. We can easily show the relations of the social
values using SV H(x) = F

H(x); SV

L (x) = F

L(x); SV

H (x) = F

H (x), and SV

L (x) =
SV L (x) + M

L (x).
Case (II) or (III):    H  P=(1  P )  C=r
It is easy to check (31) in general. Using (31) and the relation between the equity values,
we have
F H(x) < F

L(x); F

L (x) < F

L(x); SV

H(x) < SV

L (x):
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Because of SV L (x) = SV

L (x) + M

L (x), we also have SV

L (x) < SV

L (x).
Lastly, we will show that F H (x) < F

H(x) below. Note that if we have F

H (x) < F

H(x),
F (x) < F (x) and SV H (x) < SV

H(x) immediately follow.
| Case (II-S) or (III):    H  C=r
We dene f(y) by
f(y) =

x
y
 
 (1  )y
r    +
(1  )(w + wH)
r
  C
r
+AH(y)

=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

x
y
 
 (1  )y
r    +
(1  )(w + wH)
r
  C
r
+ (1  )(   H)

(y  x^H)
x
y
 
 (1  )y
r    +
(1  )(w + wH)
r
  C
r

+(1  )

x
y
 
 (1  )x^H
r    +
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+    H

(y > x^H)
(44)
Note that
F H(x) =
(1  )x
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+
C
r
+ f(xH) (45)
F H (x) =
(1  )x
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+
C
r
+ f(xH ): (46)
We have only to show that f(xH ) < f(x

H). By computing the derivatives of (44), we can
easily show that
f 0(y) < 0 (y > ~y); (47)
where ~y is dened by
~y =
(r   )
   1

w + wH
r
+    H   C
1  

(< x^H): (48)
By (8), (24), (48), and    H  C=r, we have
~y  xH < xH : (49)
By (47) and (49), we have f(xH ) < f(x

H).
| Cases (I-S) and (II):    H  P=(1  P )  C=r <    H
In the symmetric information case, the rm chooses liquidation and the liquidation trigger
xH becomes (5). We have
F H(x) =
(1  )x
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+
C
r
+ (1  )

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH
r
+    H

>
(1  )x
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+
C
r
+ f(xH): (50)
If C=r + Pw=(1  P )r >    H , we have
(50) >
(1  )x
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+
C
r
+ f(xH ) = F

H (x)
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by ~y  xH < xH and (47). If C=r + Pw=(1   P )r     H , we have xH < x^H , and
hence, we have
F H (x) =
(1  )x
r     
(1  )(w + wH)
r
+
C
r
+

x
xH
 
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)x

H
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r
  C
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
<
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r
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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w + wH
r
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+
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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H
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w + wH
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
= F H(x):
The proof is completed.
D Proof of Proposition 5
In Case (I), we have F (x) = E(x) + C=r and F (x) = E(x) + C=r. Then, we have
only to show the results of E(x) and E(x). In the symmetric information case, we have
E(x) =PEL(x) + (1  P )EH(x)
=(1  )

x
r     
w + C
r
  PwL
r
+ P

x
xL
 
  x

L
r    +
w + wL
r
+    L

 (1  P )wH
r
+ (1  P )

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH
r
+    H

: (51)
By (51) and the envelope theorem, we have
@E(x)
@wL
= P (1  )

 1
r
+

x
xL
 1
r

< 0;
@E(x)
@L
=  P (1  )

x
xL

< 0
On the other hand, in the asymmetric information case, we have
E(x) =PEL (x) + (1  P )EH (x)
=(1  )

x
r     
w + wH + C
r
+ P

x
xL
 
  x

L
r    +
w + wL
r
+    L

+(1  P )

x
xH
 
  x

H
r    +
w + wH
r
+    H + P
1  P

w
r
 

:
(52)
By (52) and the envelope theorem, we have
@E(x)
@wL
= (1  )

P

x
xL
 1
r
  (1  P )

x
xH
 P
(1  P )r

=
(1  )P
r

x
xL

 

x
xH

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and
@E(x)
@L
= (1  )

 P

x
xL

+ (1  P )

x
xH
 P
1  P

= (1  )P

x
xH

 

x
xL

:
Then, the results follows from Proposition 3.
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Table 1: Dierences between the symmetric and asymmetric information cases.
C=r [0;    H  P=(1  P )) [   H  P=(1  P );    H) [   H ;    L) [   L;+1)
Sym. Case (I-S) Case (II-S) Case (III)
Asym. Case (I) Case (II) Case (III)
Table 2: Base parameter values.
r    x w wH wL  H L  P C
0:06 0:01 0:2 0:15 2 0:5 0:1 0 5 1 0 0:3 0:5 1
Table 3: Optimal capital structure.
C LV CS xL xH E(x) D(x) M(x) F (x) SV (x)
Sym. 1:12 0:54 0:013 0:81 0:86 12:9 15:26 0 28:16 28:16
Asym. 1:14 0:56 0:014 0:82 0:92 12:2 15:37 0:57 27:57 28:14
Asym-SV 1:07 0:53 0:013 0:79 0:89 12:91 14:65 0:59 27:56 28:15
30
0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
X(t)
 
 
D∗∗(X(t))
0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15
6.9
6.95
7
7.05
7.1
7.15
7.2
X(t)
 
 
D∗∗(X(t))
1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
X(t)
 
 
D∗∗(X(t))
D∗∗
H
(x
H
∗∗)
D∗∗
H
(x
H
∗∗)
D∗∗
L
(x
H
∗∗)
D∗∗
L
(x
H
∗∗)
D∗∗
H
(x
H
∗∗)
D∗∗
L
(x
L
∗∗)
Figure 1: Jumps in the debt value. We set P = 0:9. In the top, middle, bottom panels, C are
set at 0:1; 0:5; and 1, respectively. The other parameter values are set at Table 2.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics with respect to  in Case (III). The other parameter values are
set at Table 2. Except for the bottom panels, the left-hand and right-hand panels show the
results in the symmetric and asymmetric information cases, respectively.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics with respect to  in Case (III). The other parameter values are
set at Table 2. The left-hand and right-hand panels show the results in the symmetric and
asymmetric information cases, respectively. Note that in the symmetric information case we
omit the social values, which are exactly equal to the rm values.
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